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Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of inflation differentials in a panel of West 
African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) states vis-à-vis its set benchmark for macroeconomic 
convergence since 2000 to date. Using a stylized 5-country model of WAMZ area, the 
differences in national inflation is analyzed in light of country specific shocks or 
differences in the monetary transmission mechanisms. The main results show 
macroeconomic (price) stabilization around a desired target was not attained.  Over the 
sample period, the un-weighted average regional inflation rates were most often above a 
single digit target and vary widely among the countries.   The major monetary policy 
instruments determinants of inflationary divergence are the pursuit of distorted interest 
rates, exchange rates overvaluation and expansionary monetary policies, which 
penalized credit and accentuated output supply/demand gaps.  
 
Keywords:  inflation differentials, price convergence, exchange rate, WAMZ members, 
panel data   
  
JEL: E31, F41.   
1.   Introduction 
One of the preconditions for the commencement of WAMZ and introduction of 
the common currency (to be known as the Eco) in these countries is the need to sustain 
low inflation nationally. It is the general expectation that these countries routing for a 
common currency, must pursue ex ante independent monetary policies not only capable 
of narrowing the inflation differentials, but also foster convergence around a single 
digit.   
 The observation, since the commencement of WAMZ in 2000 is that this 
primary condition has been the most difficult to fulfill.  Not only has there been 
                                                 
† E. D. Balogun is a Lecturer in the Dept. of Economics, University of Lagos.  The views expressed in 
this paper are strictly those of the author. 
persistent divergence in inflation among these countries, the prospect for attaining its 
convergence has also been weak thereby deeming commencement prospect also.  If 
progress is to be made towards convergence, there is therefore the need to understand 
what generates the inflation differentials among these countries.  In particular, there is 
the need to ascertain the role of nominal exchange rates volatility 
(appreciation/depreciation), under independent floating exchange rate regime as well as 
the independent monetary policy stance in generating inflationary spiral in these 
countries.   The objective of this study therefore is to ascertain the determinants or 
factors giving rise to these differences in the light of historical differences in 
independent monetary policy pursuits. 
The rest of the paper presents a brief review of related literature in part 2.  Part 3 
reviews the theoretical and analytical models.  Part 4 presents the results while Part 5 
the concluding remarks and policy implications.  
2. Related Literatures 
Various New Keynesian models have been used to analyze the inflation 
differentials in the especially in the euro area.  One  of  such  models  for  the  euro  area  
economies  is  put  forward  by  Hofmann  and Remsperger  (2005).  Their  empirical  
analysis  of  inflation  differentials  is  carried  out  by  panel generalized method of 
moments over the period 1999Q1-2004Q2. Their results suggest that the observed  
inflation  differentials  are  mainly  influenced  by  differences  in  cyclical  positions  
and fluctuations  of  the  effective  exchange  rate  combined  with  a  rather  high  level  
of  inflation  persistence,  while  the  proxies  of  price  level  convergence  does  not  
come  out  significantly.  Hofmann and Remsperger (2005) also find that the degree of 
inflation persistence depend on the past monetary policy regime and expectations. Their 
results indicate that countries with a history of  low  and  stable  inflation  rates  exhibit  
zero  persistence,  while  the  persistence  is  rather  high otherwise.  Given  this  
 2
finding, the authors  conclude  that  the  monetary  policy  of  the  Euro system geared at 
delivering and maintaining low and stable inflation rates in the euro area should reduce 
inflation persistence in the future.  
Analogously  to  the  aforementioned  study,  Angeloni  and  Ehrmann  (2007)  
propose  a  stylised  12-country  model  of  the  euro  area  represented  by  aggregate  
demand  and  aggregate  supply equations and use it to analyze the inflation and output 
differentials observed across the euro area over the period 1998Q1-2003Q2. Angeloni 
and Ehrmann (2007) point out that the main source of differentials in the early years of 
the euro area have been aggregate demand or potential output shocks, followed by 
domestic cost-push disturbances, while euro exchange rate shocks come only third. 
Moreover,  the  authors  emphasize  that  inflation  persistence  have played  a  central  
role  in amplifying and perpetuating inflation differentials within the monetary union. 
They claim that for plausible parameter values even small changes in persistence can 
produce dramatic changes in the inflation differentials.  The  paper  also  concludes  that  
a  tight  control  of  average  area-wide inflation around a target tends to reduce the 
differentials.  
The long-run determinants of inflation differentials in the euro area are 
examined by Altissimo et al. (2005). In first part of their study, the authors analyze 
evidence on the statistical features of observed  dispersion  in  headline  inflation  rates  
as  well  as  changes  in  the  components  of  the consumer  price  indexes  in  the  euro  
area.  Their findings suggest that most of the dispersion  in European inflation occurs in 
the services category of the EU’s harmonized consumer prices. In the second part of the 
study, the authors build a dynamic factor model to investigate the sources of dispersion  
in  sector-based  measures  of  dispersion  in, on  the  one  hand,  a common  component 
driven by common factors, and on the other hand, an idiosyncratic component. 
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Altissimo et al. (2005) conclude that their outcomes are in contrast with the supposition 
that real exchange rate is primarily driven by regionally asymmetric productivity shocks 
in the traded sector. Indeed, they point instead to relative variations in productivity in 
the non-traded sector as the main cause of price  and  inflation  differentials,  with  
shocks  to  productivity  in  the  traded  sector  being  largely absorbed by movements in 
the terms of trade in the regional economies.   
 Honohan and Lane (2003) estimate the panel data model to assess the driving 
factors of inflation differentials in the euro area over the period 1999-2001.  More 
specifically, they examine the relative influence of the country’s external exposure, the 
cyclical position, the fiscal policy, and the price level convergence. Their results suggest 
that all aforementioned variables belong to vital determinants of inflation differentials in 
the euro area.  
Horvath and Koprnicka (2008) examine the determinants of inflation 
differentials in a panel of the new European Union member states vis-à-vis the euro 
area in 1997-2007. Their main results are that exchange rate appreciation and higher 
price level in the new  EU  members  is  associated  with  narrower  inflation  
differential  vis-à-vis  the euro area, while fiscal deficit and positive output gap seem 
to contribute to higher inflation differential.  Nevertheless, the effect of price 
convergence on inflation differentials is found to be dominating in these countries.  
Their study shows that a country with price level 20% below the euro area average 
is likely to exhibit inflation nearly one percentage point above the  euro  area.  They 
therefore concluded that real convergence factors rather than cyclical variation are 
more important for inflation developments in the new EU members, as compared to 
the euro area. 
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3. The Theoretical and Analytical Framework 
The model adopted for this study draws from various New Keynesian models 
that have been used to analyze the inflation differentials in the euro area (i.e. the degree 
of non-convergence of prices {Hofmann and Remsperger  (2005), Angeloni  and  
Ehrmann  (2007), Altissimo et al. (2005), and Honohan and Lane (2003)}.  In particular 
the empirical methodology specified for this study draws from Honohan and Lane 
(2003) and Horvath and Koprnicka (2008) who focus their attention to finding the 
relationship between inflation differentials and the role of exchange rate channel, output 
gap, fiscal policy, and the  countries’ relative price level in a panel of euro area 
countries using annual data over 1999-2001.  Honohan and Lane (2003) postulated a 
fairly general specification for inflation differentials as: 
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Where itπ  and are the annual national and euro zone inflation rates, respectively;  
and  denote national and euro area variables that exercise short-term influence on the 
inflation rate;  and  denote the national and euro area price levels,  and  
represent the national and euro zone long-run equilibrium price levels.   In order to 
account for long run convergence, in the face of tight trade and institutional linkages, 
Honohan and Lane (2003) assume a common long-run national and euro area price 
level, simplifying Eq. 1 as: 
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Horvath and Koprnicka (2008) noted that it is easy to realize that a combination of euro 
area variables results in a time dummy, and as such re-wrote Eq. 2 as: 
)3.(1 EqPz ititittit LLLLεδβφπ +++= −  
Where they define the z in line with Honohan and Lane (2003) as:  
  )4.(],,[ 1 EqFISCGAPNEERz ititit LLLLL−Δ=
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Where  is the lagged change of nominal effective exchange rate;  
denotes the output gap,  represent the fiscal deficit and is the lagged price 
level.  Horvath and Koprnicka (2008) estimated the following empirical specification: 
1−Δ itNEER itGAP
itFISC itP
)5.(13211 EqPFISCGAPNEER ititititittit Lεδβββφπ ++++Δ+= −−  
They noted that the time dummies )( tφ in Eq. 5 capture the common movements in 
inflation, so that the regression explains the inflation differentials in terms of 
idiosyncratic national movements.  Horvath and Koprnicka (2008) expectations of the 
coefficient on effective exchange rate β1  is negative, as exchange rate appreciation is 
expected to decrease inflation rate.  On the other hand, β2 is expected to be positive, as 
higher output gap results in more inflationary environment.  β3 is likely to be negative, 
as fiscal surplus reduces aggregate demand and therefore contributes to lower inflation.  
The sign of δ is expected to be negative as lower price level is likely to be associated 
with higher inflation rate.  They further posit that for obvious reasons, output gap and 
fiscal balance can be endogenous to inflation and therefore estimated Eq. 5 by the 
generalized method of moments (GMM), where endogenous variables were 
instrumented by lagged values.  
Empirical Models 
The empirical models to be estimated rely very strongly on the theoretical 
foundations of these New Keynesian models.  With regard to aggregate price 
stabilization around a preset target or benchmark, I adopt Horvath and Koprnicka 
(2008), i.e. Eq.  3:      
)3.(1 EqPz ititittit LLLLεδβφπ +++= −   
but with significant modifications. Whereas they define the vector z of Eq. 3 as: 
where ],,[ 1 ititit FISCGAPNEERz −Δ= 1−Δ itNEER  is the lagged change of nominal 
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effective exchange rate;  denotes the output gap,  represent the fiscal 
deficit and  is the lagged price level, I redefine the vector z as:  
where 
itGAP itFISC
itP
],,,,,[ 21 ititititit iCGCPMyNERz −Δ= 1−Δ itNER  is the lagged change in nominal 
exchange rate of the national currencies to the US $, their dominant reserve currency; 
denotes the real output while is money supply, which is an important 
component of independent monetary policy targets of WAMZ countries, in the light of 
pursuits of multiple objectives of macroeconomic stabilization policy;  and  
represents banking sector credit to private and government sectors respectively, to 
capture the loose stand of monetary policy with regard to government borrowing and 
the extent of bias it implies for private sector credit; and finally,  denotes the overall 
interest rate policy stance of the monetary authorities, represented in this model by the 
monetary policy rate or minimum rediscount rates.  This gives us the following 
empirical specification: 
ity 2M
itCP itCG
iti
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Whereby itπ  is the net inflation differential of each participating country from optimal 
targets; tφ  represents cross-sectional fixed effects constants of independent movements 
in inflation differentials within the panel; βs are regression coefficients of the included 
explanatory variables, δ the regression coefficient of past trends in aggregate price 
level.    
 The expectation of the coefficient of nominal exchange rate β1 is negative, as 
exchange rate appreciation is expected to decrease inflation rate.  On the other hand, β2 
is expected to be positive, as higher output gap results in more inflationary environment.  
β3 is likely to be negative, as expansion in credit to the private sector is expected to lead 
to output expansion (a positive shock) and therefore contributes to lower inflation. β4 is 
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likely to be positive, as expansion in credit to government is expected to lead to 
expansion in aggregate demand and therefore contributes to higher inflation. β5 is likely 
to be positive, as expansion in aggregate money supply is expected to lead to expansion 
in aggregate demand and therefore contributes to higher inflation.   β6 is likely to be 
negative, as lower interest rates is expected to lead to output expansion (a positive 
shock) and therefore contributes to lower inflation.  The sign of δ is expected to be 
negative as lower price level is likely to be associated with higher inflation rate.  
4. Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents the Equation 6 regression results of the determinants of 
inflation differential of WAMZ countries from the less than 10 per cent target set for the 
commencement of 
WAMZ.   The adjusted 
R2 value, which 
measures the overall 
goodness of fit of the 
regression, show that 
independent monetary 
policy stance variables 
could only account for 
about 45 per cent of 
inflation divergence 
from set targets. It can 
be inferred that efforts 
at macroeconomic 
(price) stabilization around a desired target was not attained.  Over the sample period, 
the un-weighted average regional inflation rates were most often above a single digit 
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Figure 1: Inflation Trends  in W A M Z, 1991-2007
target and vary widely among 
the countries. The summary 
of the descriptive statistics 
associated with the 
inflationary pattern displayed 
in Figure 1 is as shown in 
Table 2.  This table shows 
that except for Gambia, all the 
WAMZ countries have had 
astonishing records of double 
digit inflation.  The country that recorded the minimum inflation rate during the study 
period is Gambia at an average of 
5.6 per cent while Sierra Leone 
recorded the maximum average 
inflation rate of 29.3.  The table 
also shows that for more than half 
the period under review, both 
Gambia and Guinea recorded single 
digit inflation with the median 
statistics estimated at 3.3 and 7.0 per cent, respectively. These two countries can be 
described as the low inflation group among WAMZ while Nigeria and Ghana are the 
highly inflation group, with Sierra Leone joining the club after a protracted period of 
political crisis and instability.   
Gambia Ghana Guinea Nigeria S/Leone
 Mean 5.6 23.1 12.2 25.3 29.3
 Median 3.3 16.4 7.0 16.9 14.1
 Maximum 29.9 102.3 38.7 123.7 588.2
 Minimum -9.2 -13.8 -9.6 -17.5 -66.3
 Std. Dev. 8.3 21.1 11.2 30.2 78.6
 Skewness 0.7 1.2 1.0 1.3 5.6
 Kurtosis 3.2 4.9 3.0 4.6 39.6
 Jarque-Bera 5.4 26.1 11.2 26.8 4083.5
 Probability 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Sum 378.1 1550.4 817.5 1693.5 1966.0
 Sum Sq. Dev. 4518.9 29260.6 8280.8 60079.2 408136.0
 Observations 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0
Table 2: WAMZ Inflation Descriptive Statistics,
1991Q1 to 2007Q4
Source: Estimated with Eviews 6.1 from the Regression Data
The overall estimate of the fixed effects constant, tφ , show significant variation 
in its value across the participating countries in WAMZ. Whereas, it exhibited a 
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Figure 2: Trends in Aggregate Consumer Price Index of WAMZ countries, 1991-2007
negative spread from the regional average in the case of the Gambia and Guinea, the 
countries with low records of inflation, it is positive for Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra 
Leone that have poor records of inflation control.  This finding tends to confirm that 
there is a wide divergence among the participants with regard to the average outcomes 
of price stabilization 
efforts, with very slim 
hope for attaining 
convergence with 
independent monetary 
policy pursuits. The 
trends in national 
consumer prices 
displayed in Figure 2 shows the divergent growth path of prices in these countries.   
The regression result also shows that the major monetary policy instruments 
determinants of inflationary divergence are the pursuit of distorted interest rates and 
expansionary monetary policies, which penalized credit and accentuated output 
supply/demand gaps, and exchange rates overvaluation.  
With regard to interest rates policy stance, the result shows that a 1% rise in 
interest rates generates about 2.25% rise in inflation rates.  This means that high 
monetary policy rates translated into high lending rates in virtually all the countries 
within the region. Two fundamental issues belie the independent interest rate policies of 
WAMZ countries:  firstly, is the lack of clear cut policy rules for an objective 
determination of optimal interest rates.  The independent monetary authorities seem to 
set interest rates arbitrarily, neither following Taylor’s rules or the Neo Keynesian 
framework as the pass-through mechanism to inflationary control. The experience in 
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Ghana and Nigeria is that monetary authorities were more concern with the adverse 
implication of cheap funds for foreign exchange management.  This was with a view to 
fostering both internal and external balance within a Mundellian framework of 
balancing the use of monetary policy represented by interest rate/reserve money control 
and fiscal policy represented by government expenditure.  This attempt was a colossal 
failure because monetary policy rates hike meant for stemming excess national demand 
could not restrain fiscal 
borrowing via ways and 
means, as well as through 
public debt instruments. 
The second is the 
pervasive internal economic 
distortion which accompanied 
the interest rates policy stance, 
especially the widened divergence between low savings rate which inhibits savings 
mobilization and high lending rates which resulted in credit apathy by both lenders and 
borrowers.  Financial market operators, especially the banking system capitalized on the 
distortions to diversify their 
portfolios from lending to 
speculations in money 
markets, in the face of a wide 
spread margin between 
savings and treasury bills rates 
which moved in tandem with 
the monetary policy rates.  
Figure 3: Trends in Nigeria's Interest Rates, 1991-
2007
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Figures 3 and 4 shows that 
both Nigeria and Ghana kept 
monetary policy rates high, 
even when savings rates 
suggest lower costs of funds. 
However, Figure 5 tends to 
suggest that the Gambia 
aligned her monetary policy 
rates to savings rates which eliminated speculations.  
Figure 5: Trends in the Gambia Interest Rates, 
1991-2007
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 The coefficient of the change in nominal exchange rate variable is not 
significant, contrary to the expectation that devaluations drive the inflationary pressures 
of these countries.  It is however positively signed implying that it could potentially be a 
cause of inflation.  This result is expected, since the currencies of these countries are 
non-traded but pegged to a basket of currencies dominated by the US Dollar ($).  The 
availability of the US Dollar quantitatively becomes the issue, while the effects of 
devaluation translate to imported inflation on a narrow basket of imported consumer 
and capital goods.  The experience, in most of the countries is that consumers resorted 
to local alternatives, while the significant efforts at foreign exchange controls through 
restrictive tariffs and quantitative controls accrued as rents to protected industries and 
traders.  This finding re-enforces the assertion that devaluation as an instrument of 
demand management approach to macroeconomic stabilization is rather ineffective to 
cope with economies that suffer from deep structural maladjustments.    
 The coefficient of the past trends in national aggregate prices on inflationary 
convergence is significant and rightly signed.  The result showed that a 100% decline in 
aggregate price level would reduce the inflation gap by about 1.1%.  This natural 
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growth path suggests that indeed inflation is not a monetary phenomenon and that 
macroeconomic losses which emanated from inadequate stabilization would be far 
greater than the noise generated from subscription to a convergence stance rooted in 
common monetary and exchange rates stance.  Also, credit to private sector exhibited 
the expected right and significant but inelastic relationship to inflation while credit to 
government variable turned out to be insignificant.  This also confirms that it may not 
be very correct to blame fiscal indiscipline reflected in public sector borrowing from the 
banking system for spiraling inflation as the monetary authorities of these countries had 
often claimed.   
5. Summary and Implications for Unionization Efforts 
This paper examines the determinants of inflation differentials in a panel of 
West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) states vis-à-vis its set benchmark for 
macroeconomic convergence since 2000 to date. Using a stylized 5-country model of 
WAMZ area, the differences in national inflation is analyzed in light of country specific 
shocks or differences in the monetary transmission mechanisms. The main results show 
that  macroeconomic (price) stabilization around a desired target was not attained.  Over 
the sample period, the un-weighted average regional inflation rates were most often 
above a single digit target and vary widely among the countries.   The major monetary 
policy instruments determinants of inflationary divergence are the pursuit of distorted 
interest rates, exchange rates overvaluation and expansionary monetary policies, which 
penalized credit and accentuated output supply/demand gaps.  
The immediate implication of these findings is that there is very slim prospect 
for the attainment of price convergence by WAMZ countries in the foreseeable future.  
In particular, the divergent path of interest rates policies among the countries, with no 
clear cut policy rules and the didactic approach to exchange rates determination all 
points to this conclusion.  This is reinforced by the pervasive internal economic 
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distortion which accompanied the interest rates policy stance, especially the widened 
divergence between low savings rate which inhibits savings mobilization and high 
lending rates which resulted in credit apathy by both lenders and borrowers.   
The finding that nominal exchange rate devaluation has relatively insignificant 
effect on inflation differential also implies that unwarranted emphasis was placed by 
these countries on exchange rate management.  Although some independent national 
studies suggest that it could be an important determinant of domestic inflation, it has not 
been effective as an instrument of demand management approach to price stabilization.  
This further suggests that these countries could be better off surrendering the inferior 
price stabilization approach to a supra-national monetary authority that compels 
compliance to a regional monetary and inflation targets.    
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